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·INTRODUCTION 
The Founding Fathers in a few, simple sentences placed the supreme 
military command in the hands of the President and gave to Congress the power 
to declare war and to raise armies. To Alexander Hamilton this division of 
power seemed proper and uncomplicated. In The Federalist, #74, he wrote: 
11 0f all the cares and concerns of government, the direction of war most 
llt 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by 
a single hand." 1 The 11 propriety 11 that he was defending was that of the 
Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution of the United States of America 
which reads as follows: 11 The President shall be Commander in Chief of the· 
Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several states 
when called into the actual service of the United Sta.tes. 11 2 Hamilton went 
on to say that this provision was "so consonant to the ·precedents of the 
State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce 
it." 3 
The belief of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that 
they had fashioned the key for popular control over military power is 
1Alexander Hamilton, James ~dison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers 
(New York:· The New American Library, 1961), p. 447. 
2u.s., Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 2, Cl. 1. 
3Hamilton, Madison, Jay, p; 447. 
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reflected in The Federalist, #69, where Hamilton contended that this power 
"would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the 
military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy," 4 
· while the power of declaring war, raising and regulating the fleets and armies 
would belong to Congress. 5 
In the intervening years since 1787 the exercise of military power 
. has been endlessly cha 11 enjed, and the federal courts have been re.i>eatedly 
asked to define and to limit the Chief Executive in his role as Comnander in 
Chief. While American constitutional law contains dozens of examples of 
judicial restraint and limitation on the Commander in Chief, comnentators 
have suggested that the courts have been ineffectual in holding the President 
within judicially defined guidelines in the exercise of military power. 
Clinton Rossiter in The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief states 
that: 
... the Court has been asked to examine only a tiny 
fraction of his significant .deeds and decisions as 
.Commander in Chief, for most of these were by nature 
challengeable in no court but that of impeachment--
which was entirely as it should have been. The 
~gurs of the presidential w~r powers have there-
f<fte been presidentially, not Judicially shaped; 
4Ibid., p. 418. 
sibid., p. 418. 
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their exercise is for Congress and the people, not 
the Court, to oversee. 6 
This paper will inquire into the validity of Rossiter's position. 
In the evolving of American history have the war powers of the President 
been defined and checked by the judiciary, or have /they been shaped by the 
Chief Executive through various crises? 
. 6c11nton Rossiter, Tfie Suprerne·court and the Conmand~r·i·~ Chief (New 
York: Cornell University Press, l95l), p. 126. I 
• 





The President in his role as Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy may take personal command of the troops as can be seen from the 
following episode. In 1794 four counties in Western Pennsylvania rebelled 
against the imposition of a tax on whiskey. In two presidential proclama-
tions Washington tried every measure short of actual combat to persuade the 
' . ' -
ins·urgents to obey the laws of the land. 7 When all else failed, Washington 
called into service 15,000 militia men from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Mary-
land, and Virginia and personally led the militia from September 25th to 
October 20th. 8 Comnenting on Washington leaving· the seat of government to· 
act as field commander of the militia force, Professor Clarence Berdahl 
states: 
President Washington was not only clear as to his right 
to take personal command of the militia forces upon 
s~ch occasions but in the case of the Whiskey Rebellion 
of 1794, was also convinced of the necessity of exer-
cising that right. He assumed active command of the 
militia forces assembled to crush the insurrection, 
visited the place of rendezvous, and personally directed 
7James D. Richardson, A Com nlation of the Messa es and Pa ers of 
the Presidents, Vol. I, 1789-1908 Washington: Bureau of Literature and 
Art, 1897), pp. 158-162. 
8Jbid., pp. 164-165 . 
....., __________ ......, ________ , ___ ,_wwww...---;,,....--------------------------------------
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the forward movement of the troops, living and marching 
with them .... 9 
When criticism arose over his leaving the seat of government while Congress 
was in session, Wash-ington denounced the criticism as 11 impertinence. 11 10 
As military commander the President possesses all of those powers 
accorded by internatio~al law to any supreme commander. In The Constitution 
of the United States Edward Corwin has cited in the following Supreme Court 
cases a most comprehensi~ list of those· powers: 11 
1350 - Commander in Chief - "He (the President) is authorized to 
direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his 
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to 
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy. He may invade the hostile country, 
and subject it to the sovereignty an_d authority of the United States. 11 12 
1852 - Power to Requisition Property - Against the enemy in the 
field, the President possesses the power to requisition property and 
compel services from citizens of the United States and friendly aliens when 
9c1arence A. Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1921), p. 135. 
lOibid.' p. 135. 
11 Edward S. Corwin, The Con;titution of the United States of America: 
Analysis and Interpretation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), 
pp. 403-404. 
12Fleming v. Page~ 9 Howard 603 (1850}. 
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necessity requires. 13 
1874 - Commercial Intercourse - The President may, at least in 
the absence of Congressional action to the contrary, permit a limited 
commercial intercourse with the enemy in time of war, and impose such con-
ditions as he sees fit: 14 
1876 - Secret Agents - "We (the Court) ha~e no difficulty as to 
the authority of the President in the matter. He (the President) was un-
• 
doubtedly authorized during the war, as Commander-in Chief of the armies 
of the United States, to employ secret agents ·to enter the rebel lines and 
obtain information respecting the strength, resources, and movements of 
the enemy. 11 15 
1888 - Dismissal and Appointment of Officers - Having once dis-
missed an officer or accepted his resignation, the President cannot revoke 
that action and thereby restore the officer to his rank and office, but 
must make a new nomination and secure a new confirmation by the Senate, if 
confirmation was required in the first instance. 16 
13Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 Howard 115 (1852). 
14Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wallace 73 (1874). 
15rotten v. United States, ~2 U.S. 105 (1876). 
16Mimnack v. United States, 97 U.S. 426, 435, 437-438 (1888). 
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1891 - Dismissal and Appointment of Officers - The provision in 
the U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 1590 that the President's power to dismiss 
an offi.cer in peaceti1~e "in pursuance of .the sentence of .a general court 
martial or in mitigation thereof" does not prevent the President from dis-
placing an officer of the Army or Navy by appointing with the advice and 
consent of the Senate another person in his place. 17 
1897 - Convening of Courts-Martial - Despite the fact that the 
• 
President is expressly authorized by statute to convene courts-martial under 
certain circumstances (Act of May 29, 1830. 4 Statute at Large, 4.17), he 
is by no means limited to that specific case, nor dependent upon statuatory. 
authority but is empowered to convene such courts-martial generally and 
in any case by virtue of his constitutional authority as Commander in 
Chief. 18 
1901 - Territorial Occupation - While the President's power with 
regard to the government of occupied territory is justly said to be 
11 necessarily despotic, 11 it has been held that this applied only to his 
executive or administrative power and not to his power to legislate for 
·that territory. "His power to administer would be absolute, but his power 
to legislate would not be without certain restrictions-~in other words, 
17Mullan v. United States, 140. U.S. 240 (1891). 
18swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897). 
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they would not extend beyond the necessities of the case. 11 19 
1909 - Territorial Occupation - The civil government of the United 
States cannot extend immediately and of its own force over conquered and 
ceded territory .... The authority to govern such ... territory is found in 
the laws applicable to conquest and cession. That authority is the military 
power, under the control of the President as Commander in Chief. 20 
1942 - Creation of Military Commissions - The Court unanimously 
• decided that this specific military commission had been lawfully constituted 
and that the saboteurs were clearly subject to its jurisdiction. It was not 
necessary for the Court to discuss the President's power as Commander in 
Chief to create this conmission, for Congress in the 15th Article of War had 
in effect 11 authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such 
commtssi ons. 11 The offenses charged against the saboteurs were of fens.es 
against the law of war, which has always recognized th.at unlawful combatants 
are subject 11 to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which 
render their belligerency unlawful. 11 21 
1952 - Military Justice - An <fir force officer on duty in Germany 
was killed by his wife in October 1949. She was tried in the U.S. Court of 
l9oooley v. United States, 1~82 U.S. 222, 234 (1901). 
20santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265 (1909). 
21Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. l (1942). 
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the Allied High Commission for Germany and was convicted of murder under ·the 
German Criminal Code and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the federal 
peni tent:Bry in the United States. Justice Burton ruled that the military 
court was properly set up under the power of the President as Commander in 
Chief. 22 
Despite the fact that the President as Corumander in Chief must be 
guided in the exercise of his power as military commander by his own judg-
• 
ment and discretion, subject to his general responsibility under the 
Constitution, it is found from the above Supreme Court cases, that the 
Court speaks only of the President as Commander in Chief in the most general 
and guarded terms. Justic.e Swayne has best expressed the Court's thinking 
on this in Stewart v. Kahn: "The measures to be taken in carrying on war 
and to suppress insurrection are not defined. The decision of all questions 
rests wholly in the discretion of those to whom the substantial powers 
involved are confided by the Constitution." 23 
One could, therefore, conclude that it is apparently up to the 
President to be specific about his powers as Commander in Chief, not the 
Court. 
22Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348 (1952). 
23stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wallace 493, 506 (1870). 
... 10 -
TROOP CALL-UP 
One must admit that at specific t.imes, particularly during war 
and mobilization, the government imposes certain obligations, but no one 
obligation is more oppressive than that one compelling personal service in 
the military. While it is true that the duty to render personal military 
service in the United States has been accepted as necessary, it has not 
• 
always been desirab!e. Roger Little points out thDt prior to the Revolu-
tionary War, the American colonies had conscripted men into their militias. 
For example, Massachusetts and Virginia resorted to conscription in 1777 
and since only two-thirds of the authorized Continental army had been 
recruited by February, 1778, Washington recommended to the Continental 
Congress that the necessary men be recruited from all the colonies by 
universal conscription. 24 
When the Constitutional Convention assembled in Philadelphia in 
1787, Hamilton argued that the ·defense and military powers of the centra 1 
government ought exist without limitation 
because it is impossible to foresee or to define the 
extent and variety of national exigencies, and the 
correspondent extent and variety of the means which 
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances 
24Roger W. Little (ed.), Selective Service and American Society (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), p. 36. 
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that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and 
for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely 
be imposed on the power to which the care of it is 
committed .... 25 
The Constitution states that Congress is delegated with the power "to raise 
and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy," and "to provide for 
calling forth the militia." These powers were reinforced by the provision 
authorizing Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into executi3n the foregoing powers. 11 26 
Given the above, it would appear that the President as Conmander 
in Chief has no powers with regard to troop call-up. This is not so, as 
Glendon Schubert succinctly points out: "The President has always been 
delegated considerable discretion in implementing the plans of Congress, 
especially with respect to the circumstances in which the reserves might 
be called up for temporary duty in time of national emergency proclaimed 
by the President himself. This was true in George Washington's time, as it. 
is today." 27 
Various Congressional .Acts passed in the late 18th, 19th, and 
early 20th centuries gave the President virtually unlimited power in 
25Hamilton, Madison, Jay, p., 153. 
26u.s., Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 12-16. 
27Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., The Presidency in the Courts (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p. 173. 
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calling up the militia and in raising armies in case of invasion, threat· 
of invasion or insurrection. 28 Clinton Ro~siter in The Supreme Court and 
the Commander in Chief discusses two leading Supreme Court cases that 
challenge the President's authority and orders with regard to military 
conscription. 29 
In the first case, Martin v. Mott, the go~ernor of the State of 
New York, in compliance with a request from the President of the United 
• 
States, ordered certain companies of militia to assemble in the City of 
New York for the purpose of entering the service of the United States. 
The President acted in accordance with a federal statute empowering him 
to call the militia whenever there shall be danger of invasion. Mott, a 
privat~ in one of the cornp_anies called, refused to comply with the order 
of the governor. In 1818 a court ma~tial imposed on ~im a fine of $96.00, 
and when he refused to pay he was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment. 
Martin, Deputy United States Marshall, seized certain. goods of Mott, which 
Mott sought to recover by action of replevin. Mr. Justice Story in his 
opinion of a unanimous decision in 1827 stated that: "We are all of the 
opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs 
exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all 
28serdahl, pp. 102-114. 
29Rossiter, pp. 14-17. 
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other persons." In essence, then, the President under law can call for the 
militia of states when no invasion has taken place. 30 
In the second .case, Luther v. Borden, the people of the State of 
Rhode Island in 1871 were still operating under the old colonial charter 
with a few minor revisions, using it as their state constitution. This con-
stitution strictly limited the right to vote. Led by a man named Dorr, the 
people at various mass meetings throughout the state instituted a new con-
• 
stitution whereby suffrage was greatly increased. The state government 
claimed that this was an insurrection and appealed to the President to de-
clare martial law. However, no federal forces were used. Members of the 
state mHitia led by Borden forced their way into the house of Luther, a 
Dorr adherent, who sued for trespass. Mr. Chief Justice Taney in -his 
opinion in 1849 dec;lared that the President in exercfsing the power conferred 
on him by Congress to send federal troops to aid states in suppressing 
insurrection had indicated that he regarded the charter government as the 
lawful government, and this decision was binding upon the Court. In other 
words, this was a purely political case and must be le.ft in the hands of the 
political branches of the government to decide. Moreover, once a political 
branch of the government reaches a decision, "the courts are bound to take 
notice of its decision, and to f0ellow it. 11 31 
30Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton 19 (1827). 
31Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard 1 (1849}. 
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Schubert cites four state c.ases in The Presidency and the Courts 
that upheld the President's authority to raise an army. 32 
1863 - The Court of Conmon Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, 
decided that the President's orders, (General Order #99 set up the method 
of selecting, drawing, and enforcing the attendance of the militia in the 
respective states; General Order #104 provided for the arrest of persons 
absenting themselves to avoid being drafted into military service), "must be 
• 
considered as having all the force of a law, the same as if specially set 
forth at length in the act." 33 
1863 - The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld President Lincoln's 
General Orders, Number 99 and 104. The argument that the President had 
been _unconstitutionally delegated legislative power was expressly rejected 
on the basis that in merely filling in the details of the statute he was 
undertaking a necessary part of his function of executing its provisions. 34 
1867 - The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that the governor of 
Wisconsin, acting as an agent of the President had properly used his dis-
cretionary powers in putting down an insurrection and enforcing the laws, 
and that his (the governor's) actions were to be regarded as those acts of 
32schubert, pp. 176-177. 
33commonwealth ex rel Wendt v. Andreas, 2 Pitts. Rep. (Pa.) 402, 404 
( 1863). 
341n re Griner, 16 Wis. 423 (1863). 
35 the President. 
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1867 - The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the fact that the 
President had the power to cause the arrest of draft dodgers for the purpose 
of forcibly inducting them into military service. 36 
In 1918 Chief Justice Edward White ruled that the Selective Draft 
Law Cases were "an act to authorize the President to increase temporarily 
the military establishmenteof the United States" and therefore upheld the 
conscription act which became and still remains the basic statement of the 
Court on the powers of the Federal government to conscript military man-
37 power. 
Also in a ruling on Arver v. United States, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Selective Draft Law of 1917 was a valid exercise of the war 
power and dispelled once and for all ttme the notion that there is something 
inherently unconstitutional or extraconstitutional about drafting men to 
fight wars. 38 In Arver v. United States the Court did not decide the con-
stitutional question (Article I, Section 8) of whether or not the President 
as Commander in Chief has the power to raise armies even with congressional 
35Drucker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 631 (1867). 
' 
36Allen v. Colby, 47 N.H. 544, 547-548 (1867). 
37selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 375 (1918). 
38Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
• 
- 16 -
approval. To ·date the Supreme Court has yet to face that question. 39 
This can be seen again in United States v. Nugent where Chief 
Justice Fred M. Vinson ruled that the Selective Service Act is a compre-
hensive statute designed to provide an orderly, efficient, and fair procedure 
to marshall the available manpower of the country, to impose a common obliga-
tion of milit~ry service on all physically fit young men .. It is. a valid 
exercise of the war power. It is calculated to function--it functions today--
in times of peril. ~O 
Therefore, the legislative history and administrative application 
on the question of compelling men to serve in the armed services of their 
country remains today, a political decision. The Supreme Court supported 
this policy when it stated that: 11 The power to compel men to serve in the 
armed forces is reasonably implied from the power to raise and support 
armies, for a grant of power with no compulsion behind it is no power at 
all. 11 41 
39schubert, p. 117. 
40united States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. l, 9 (1953). 
41Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). See Carl Brent Swisher, 
11 The Supreme Court and Conscription, 11 Current History, Vol. 54, pp. 351-357 
for an excellent summation of mil,tary conscription from the Revolution to 
the present day. 
17 
MILITARY JUSTICE 
Military justfce comes under the heading of two tribunals, i.e., 
courts-martial for those offenders of military law, and military commissions 
for the trial of those offenders of the laws of. war as well as martial law. 
{See Section 2 for a discussion of military commissions.) Authority for 
courts-martial stems from•congressional statutes whereas the authority for 
military commissions stems from the common law of war. 42 Despite the fact 
that authorization for courts-martial lies in the hands of Congress, its 
control rests primarily in the hands of the President as Commander in Chief. 
"They are creatures of orders, the power to convene them, as well as the 
power to act upon their proceeding, being an attribute of command." 43 
Under the Act of May 29, 1830, the President is expressly author-
ized by statute to convene general courts-martial under certain circum-
stances. 44 However, this does not mean that the President as the fountain-
head of military justice is expressly limited to that specific case, nor 
is he dependent upon statuatory authority. As Rossiter points out in 
42serdahl, p. 138. 
43william W. Winthrop, Di est of 0 in1ons: Jud e Advocate General 
{Washington: Superintendent of Documents, 1901 , p. 283. 
44u.s., Statutes at Large, IV, 417. 
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The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief citing Swaim v. United States--
that he (the President) is empowered to convene such courts-martial, generally 
and in any case, by virtue of his constitutional authority as Commander in 
Chief. 45 David G. Swaim, Judge Advocate General with the rank of Brigader 
General, was accused of fraud and.improper dealings with a Washington bank. 
He was found guilty, sentenced, and brought suit on . the grounds _that the 
general courts-martial ha~been unlawfully constituted and that he had been 
unlawfully tried and sentenced. Justice Shiras declared that the courts-
martial in question was duly convened and organizeciand that the questions 
decided were within its lawful scope of action, and further that it would be 
out of place for the court to express any opinion. 46 
A further discussion of non-intervention in cases of courts-martial 
is found in the following cases: 
1827 - The Court granted conclusive discretion to the President 
and his officers in such matters as fixing the number of officers between 
the statuatory limits of five and thirteen for any particular courts-
martial. 47 
In 1894 the Court went so far as to say that a person convicted of 
45Rossiter, p. 102. ' 
.46swaim v. United St.ates, 165 U.S. 553, 558 (1897). 
47Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton 19, 34-35 (1827). 
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a courts-martial must exhaust all administrative remedies ... before a fede'ral 
court would be justified in granting a hearing to entertain collateral 
attack on the courts-martial 's judgment. 48 
The Civil Court ruled in 1857 in Dynes v. Hoover that civil 
courts do not handle courts-martial--if they did, they would virtually 
administer the rules and articles of war, irrespective of those .to whom that 
duty and obligation has b'iien confided by the laws of the United States from 
whose decisions no appeal or jurisdiction of any kind has been given to the 
civil magistrates or civil courts. 49 
1902 - The Court stated that a member of the armed forces belongs 
to a separate conmunity recognized by the Constitution and.therefore must be 
tried by a courts-martial .. 50 
In 1911 the Court ruled that "to those in military or naval service 
of the United States, the military law is the due process." 51 
While it is the President's own judgment as to the convening of 
courts-martial, he may delegate this action to a subordinate such as the 
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as can be seen from the 
48In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1894). 
' 49oynes v. Hoover, 20 Howard 65 (1857). 
50carter v. Mela ugh ry, 183 U.S. 365 ( 1902) . 
51Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911). 
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rulings in the following cases. 
In Runkle v. United States the Court declared that it was up to 
the President's judgment· as to the convening of courts-martial, and the 
finding in United States v. Fletcher stated that he (the President) could 
delegate this power to one of his subordinates; namely the Secretary of War 
or the Secretary of the Navy. 52 
The Court furthw- ruled in Bishop v. ~United States that the actions 
of the presidential delegates in convening courts-martial were presumed to be 
those acts of the President. 53 
Given a look at the above cases, it can be said that, in general, 
the Courts will not interfere in the jurisdiction of military justice. 54 
The Courts will, however, review cases to ascertain if the courts-martial 
was legally constituted; to ascertain whether the military had jurisdiction 
of the case; and to ascertain whether or not the sentence was duly approved 
52Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557 (1887) and United States v. 
Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1893). 
53Bishop v. United States, 197 U.S~ 334, 341-342 (1905). 
54cases under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the 1940's and 
1950's will not be reviewed here as they deal primarily with the relationship 
of courts-martial to civilian courts--not with the powers of the President as 
Commander in Chief. The cases ar~ Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); 
Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); United States ex rel Hirshberg v. 
Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); United States ex rel Toth v. uarles, 350 U.S. 
11 (1955); and Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 1957 . See C. Herman 
Pritchett, The American Constitution (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
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and authorized by law. 55 
Edward F. Shennan, in his article on "Military Injustice," SllllS up 
' the Court's position on military law cases in the following statement: 
Supreme Court decisions do not directly affect the 
military because military law has been held to be an 
autonomous legal system not subject to the same con-
stitutional standards as civil courts. However, the 
Court of Military Appeals, a civilian court created 
in 1951 by the Uniform Code of Military Justice as a 
sort of 'Military Supreme Court' has applied a number 
of Supreme Cour-adecisions to the military, the 
latest test being the application of Mir~nda to the 
military in United States v. Tempir in 1967. 56 
55swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 217 (1893). 
56Edward F. Sherman, i'Military Injustice," New Republic, Vol. 158 




Before attempting to discuss the President's role as Corrmander in 
Chief in military government, it must first be ascertained what military 
government is. Mr. Winthrop defines it as "that dominion exercised in war by 
a belligerent power over territory invaded and occupied by him and over the 
inhabitants thereof." 57 Chief Justice Chase defined military government in 
lit 
Ex parte Milligan.as "military justice to be exercised in time of foreign 
war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and 
civil war within states and districts occupied by rebels treated as 
belligerents; .•. by the military commander under the direction of the Presi-
dent, with the express or implied sanction of Congress." 58 
Belligerent or military occupation· has been going on from ancient 
times up to and including the 20th Century in some way, shape, or form.· 
Caesar's memoirs provide a running commentary on his 
relations with the Helvetians, the Belgae, and the 
Nervii, while the protests back in Rome that Caesar was 
usurping the Senate's authority by making political 
decisions are not without their modern counterparts. 
Alexander, Belisarius, Hannibal, Napoleon, George Rogers 
Clark, Winfield Scott, Cecil Rhodes, Sherman, and 
57william W. Winthrop, An Abridgment of Military Law (New York: John 
Wi 1 ey and Sons , 1893) , p. 322. 
58Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2, 141-143 (1866). · 




Pershing--all knew military government at first hand ...... 59 
One out of every six years of our national existence has been spent in war, 
. 
and there have been at least seventeen instances in which the United States 
has participated in military occupation of one kind or another. 60 
In 1862 President Lincoln directed a lawyer, Francis Lieber, to 
draw up a code of laws for military occupation, directing the troops in the 
laws of war. Under Articl; I of the Code, it states that "Martial Law is the 
immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest. The 
,presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law." Article II adds that 
11 Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by special 
proclamation, ordered by the Commander in Chief,"and in Article III can be 
found a clause stating that "the commander of the forces may proclaim that the 
administration of all civil and penal law shall continue, either wholly or in 
part, as in times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military author-
ity." 61 Given Lieber'swording of his Code, one can easily assume that he 
was concerned more with the unhampered ability of the conquerors to act, than 
with limitations restricting the conquerors. 
59Hardy C. Dillard, "Power and Persuasion: The Role of Military. -
Government," The Yale Law Review, Vol. 42 (December, 1952), p~- 212. 
60Ibid., p. 212. 
~ 
61 
, War of the Rebellion--Official Records of the Union and 
Confede-r-at_e__,.A-rm_,i,.....e-s-, Series III, Vol. III, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1899), pp. 148-164. 
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Prior. to Lieber's Code, Justice Story ruled ·in 1819 that by the 
conquest and military occupation of Castine (by the British in the War of 
1812) the enemy acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise 
the fullest right of sovereignty over that place. 62 Along the same line of 
thought, President Polk stated in a special message to the House of Repre-
sentatives on July 24, 1848, that "military occupation permits the occupant, 
during the war, to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty" over the 
• 
occupied territory. The sovereignty of the enemy is thereby suspended and 
· his laws can "no longer be rightfully enforced over the conquered territory 
or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remain and submit to the con-
queror." 63 
Given the above, then, when American military operations bring 
. foreign territories under its contra l, it is up to the President as 
Commander in Chief to "take whatever measures he thinks necessary to insure 
the we 11-bei ng of the American occupying forces and those of the people of 
the occupied area. This may involve the taking over of the entire government 
of the area under military control." 64 However, the military control of the 
62united States v. Rice, 4 Wheaton 246 (1819). 
63Richardson, Vol. IV, p. 595. 
64Joseph E. Kallenbach, The American Chief Executive (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1966), p. 540. 
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r 
f f; occupied territory does not give the President as Commander in Chief the 
• ~. authority to annex the occupied territory to the United States. This was 
'i 
r evidenced in Chief justice Taney's opinion in Fleming v. Page. In holding 
that military occupation of the port of Tampico during the Mexican War did 
not annex it to the United States, Taney said: 11 His (the President's) duty 
and his power are purely military. As Commander in Chief~ he is authorized 
to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at 
• 
his command, and to employ them in a manner he may deem most effectual to 
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy .... But his conquests .do not enlarge 
the boundaries of this union. 11 65 
In his article on "American Experiences with Military Government" 
Ralph Gaoriel states that: 
The exercise of military government is a command respon-
sibility and full legislative, executive and judicial 
authority is vested in the command general of the theatre 
of operations. By virtue of his posit ion he is the mil i -
tary governor of the occupied territory and his supreme 
authority is limited only by the laws and customs of 
war. Military government is primarily an instrument for 
carrying out the policy of the .. President in his role g5 
Commander in Chief, established in the Constitution. 
A classic example of command responsibility is that of General 
William S. Graves who refused to recognize General Otani of the Japanese 
65Fleming v. Page, 9 Howard 603 (1850). 
66Ralph H. Gabriel, "American Experiences with Military Government," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 37 (June, 1943), p. 438. 
'. 
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Imperial Army as head of the Allied Council and his disposition of American 
troops in the attempt by the United States to keep Japan out of Siberia. 
Graves demanded to know who put the American soldiers in their presently 
located areas; Otani responded that the Inter-Allied Council under his com-
I ~/' 
mand had situated them. Graves then stated: "Well, let's get this matter 
straightened out right now. I am in command of the American Expeditionary 





ordering my troops to railroad zones •••• " The War Department and the 
President gave full approval to his conduct as military commander. 67 
Professor Berdahl cites other cases in War Powers of the Executive 
·in the United States whereby the Supreme Court has conceded that the Presi-
dent's power and authority as Commander in Chief gives him absolute discre-
tion in the realm of occupied territory, 68 subject only to the vaguely · 
defined international laws of war. 69 
Early in 1847 the President as constitutional Commander in Chief 
of the Anny and Navy, authorized the mi 1 i tary and nava 1 cornnander of our 
forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror, and 
I : • • ! I' ' ,Jo.-
to fonn a civil government ~or~ t~e conque
1
red c1ou~~ry, ~,nd. t~_!!!!Pos-eduti es on 
' 
67Ibid., p. 438. 
68eerdahl, pp. 191-199.. "', 1 ~-.-----6-9_K_a1."1_~_nb~a_c_h_,_p_. __ s4_1_ • .._ _________________ ,_1_._i1_1_1_,,_ .. ; ______________ ... 




imports and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the govern-
ment, and of the anny which had the conquest in possession. The Court ruled 
that no one can doubt that these orders of the President, and the action of 
our army and navy commander in California, in conformity with them, was 
according to the law of anns and the right to conquest, or that they were 
operative until the ratification and exchange of a Treaty of Peace. 70 
Upon the conques.t of New Mexico the executive authority of the 
United States properly established a provisional government which instituted 
a judicial system, the legality of which was recognized by the Supreme 
Court. 71 
In Texas v. White the Supreme Court held that so long as the war 
contfoued it cannot be denied that he (the President) might institute 
temporary governments within insurgent districts·, occupied by the national 
forces, or take measures, in any state, for the restoration of State govern-
ments faithful to the Union, employing, however, in such efforts only such 
means and such agents as were authorized by constitutional laws. 72 
When during the late Civil War, portions of the insurgent territory 
70cross v. Harrison, 16 Howard 164, 190 (1853). 
71Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 ffoward 176, 177-178 (1857). 
72Texas v. White, 7 Wallace 700, 730 (1868). 
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were occupied by the national forces, it was within the constitutional 
authority of the President as Commander in Chief to establish therein pro-
visional courts for the hearing and determination of all causes arising 
under the laws of the State or of the United States; and the provisional 
court for the State of Louisiana organized under the Proclamation of October 
20, 1862 was, therefore, rightfully authorized to exercise such jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court held that-"the duty of the national government •.. was no 
I 
other than that which devolves upon the government 1 of a belligerent occupy-
ing, during war, the territory of another belligerent. It was a military 
duty to be performed by the President as Conmander in Chief and entrusted as 
such with the direction of the military force by which the occupation was 
held. 73 
In Dow v. Johnson the Supreme Court ruled that "It is not the civil 
law of the invaded country; it is not the civil law of the conquering 
country; it is the military law--the law of war11 --that governs a milit,rily 
occupied territory. 74 
It was declared in 1901 that Cuba is a foreign territory within 
the meaning of the Act of Congress of June 6, 1900, amending the United 
States Revised Statute, Section 5270 ••• the island is under a -~!JJ..tat<y govern-
'f. . 
ment appointed by the President of the United States in the work of assisting 
73rhe Grapeshot, 9 Wallace 129 (1869). 
740ow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 170 (1879). 
29 
the inhabitants of the island to establish a government of their own. The 
court ruled that the occupancy and control of the island of Cuba under 
military authority of the United States cannot be deemed to be an uncon-
stitutional and unauthorized interference with the internal affairs of a 
friendly power, by virtue of the joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 
1898 declaring that 11 the people of Cuba are, of right ought to be, free and 
independent," since this declaration was not intended as a recognition of 
• the existence of an organized government instituted by the people of that 
island in hostility to the government maintained by Spain. 75 
The Supreme Court ruled in Dooley v. United States that the 
President's power, is necessarily despotic in military occupation, but that 
this must. be understood rather in an administrative than in a legislative 
sense. 76 
In Herrera v. United States the Court ruled that nei~her the 
capitulation of Santiago and the cessation of active military operations in 
the Santiago district, nor the Presidential proclamation of July 13, 1898, 
,, 
(General Order 101 - "private property, whether belonging to individuals or 
corporations is to be respected and can be confiscated only for cause"), 
with reference to the rights of private property, changed the character of a 
75Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 124 (1901). 




Spanish merchant vessel lying in the harbor as enemy's property, nor exempted 
it from liability to capture by the military authorities for military purposes 
1• The Court upheld the capture of the vessel in that it was seized as property 
~ for pu.rposes of war and not of gain. 77 
r [ The Supreme Court upheld all of the above decisions, as well as 
' f 
f the President's power as Commander in Chief to organize and practically 
L 
control the judiciary oft~ territory under military occupation, with the 
following exception: 
In Jecker v. Montgomery decided in 1851, the Court held that 
neither the President nor anymilitary officer can establish a court in a 
conquered country and authorize it to decide upon the rights of the United 
States· or of individuals in prize cases, nor to administer the laws of the 
nation. The courts established and sanctioned in· Mexico were nothing more 
than agents of military power to assist it in preserving order in the 
conquered territory and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and 
property while it was occupied by the American army. They were not courts of 
the United States and they had no right to adjudicate upon a question· of a 
prize or no prize. 78 
The issue of military occupation is not a dated subject. It is as 
current as present American involvement in Korea, the Dominican Republic and 
77Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558, 571 (1912). 
78Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 Howard 498, 515 (1851). 
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Vie~nam. Though the fonns, definitions, or styles may change, the problem of 
occupation will always be present as long as the United States has a military 
or national security problem. Professor Berdahl aptly sums up the situation 
by saying: "Since all the powers and functions of military government are 
concentrated in the hands of the President, with scarcely any limitation, it 
would not be an exaggeration to characterize such government as an absolutism 
of the most complete sort. 11 79 
• 
79 . Berdahl, p. 164. 
,. . 
• 




ALIEN ACTS OF 1798 
·The first attempt at alien and enemy control through legislation 
came with Congress' passage of a series of acts called the Naturalization, 
Alien, and Sedition Acts which were primarily aimed at domestic dissatis-
faction as well as at foreign danger. This section of the paper will concern 
itself only with the Alien Act . 
• 
War with France was expected daily during the Sumner of 1798 by 
which time "the French had captured over three hundred American merchant 
vessels, and an undeclared war with France was raging on the sea. 11 80 The 
Federalist majority hastily passed the Alien Act among others. 81 This Act 
not only .authorized the President to remove all aliens whom he considered 
. dangerous to the pe~ce and safety of the country, but ·it also provided the 
President with the power to deport those aliens who were merely suspected of 
treasonable or secret schemes against the government. 82 
If an alien was deported from the country, and should return and 
'> 
be found at large, he was to be tried and if convicted~ sentenced to 
80Frank Donovan, The Thomas Jefferson Papers (New York: Dodd, Mead and 
Company, 1963), p. 163. , 
1 .. 8 U.S., Statutes at Large, I, 570. 
82James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1956), p. 51. 
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imprisonment for a term not to exceed three years, as well as forfeiting· all 
rights to ever becoming a citizen of the United States. 83 
The Act not only set forth the ground rules for expulsion, but 
also provided for a national registration and surveillance system in which 
those aliens remaining in the country would have to have a special pennit 
issued by a presidential agent. There were exceptio.ns to the rule, however, 
whereby the President mig~t exempt foreign ministers, consuls, alien mer-
chants, etc., from obtaining the special permits as well as an executive 
grant of safe conduct or passport privileges as long as the aliens conformed 
to presidential regulations. 84 
( "The worst feature of this Act was the extent of .the power that it 
' r I left to the President. Th~ poor aliens, as the Republicans called· them, 
l ~ were pl aced at his mercy; ... it was necessary to create some authority for the 
r ;, 
[ enforcement of the law, and Congress considered that the President, through 
' 
t his marshalls, could best execute it." 85 
, ..
" President John Adams, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1813, 
asserted that he had never applied the Alien Act in a single instance. 
· 
83Ibid., p. 52. 
84Ibid., p. 53, 54. 
85John S. Bassett, The American Nation: A History, Vol. II, The 
t Federalist System, 1789-1801 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1906)..t .12.," 258. 
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As your name is subscribed to that law, as vice-presi-
dent, and mine as President, I know not why you are 
not as responsible for it as I am. Neither of us was 
concerned in the formulation of it. We were then at 
war with France. French spies then swarmed in our 
cities and our country; some of them were intolerably 
impudent, turbulent, and seditious. To check these, 
was the design of this law. Was there ever a govern-
ment which had not authority to defend itself against 
spies in its own bosom--spies of an enemy at war? 
This law was never executed by me in any instance. 86 
However, there were.as Frait'lk M. Anderson points out in his article on "The 
Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws;" 
indications if not proofs that a considerable number 
of aliens anticipating the enforcement of the law, left 
the country on account of it. A 1 arge number of French 
refugees from the West Indies were in the United States 
when the Alien Act was passed. Letombe, the French 
consul general, estimated the number at 20,000 to 25,000. 
Other estimates were even higher. The Archives of the Depart-
ment of State at Washington contain abundant evidence that 
directly after the passage of the Alien Act, large numbers 
of these French refugees left the United States. Although 
the going of most of these can be fully accounted for on 
other grounds, there are indications that with some of 
them, apprehension on account of the Alien Act was a 
factor in bringing about thei~ departure. 87 
The ultimate justification of the Alien Act which was to continu~ 
in force until December, 1799, was that it was necessary to the defense of 
the country against foreign aggression. Its powers conferred to the P.resident 
- _,.,,.,.,.-
86charles F. Adams, The Works of John Adams, Vol. X {Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1856), p. 42. 
87Frank M. Anderson, "The Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws," 





were upheld as a legitimate exercise of the war power in a House ·conmittee 
Report submi~ted on February 21, ~7-99~ The Report reads as follows: 
The right of removing aliens, as an incident to the 
power of war and peace, according to the theory of the 
Constitution, belongs to the government of the United 
States .•. Congress is required to protect each state 
from invasion; and it is vested •.• with powers to make 
all laws which shall be proper to carry into effect all 
powers vested by the Constitution in the government of 
the United States, or in any department or officer there-
of; and to retnolll! from the country, in times of hostility, 
dangerous aliens, who may be employed in;preparing the 
way for invasion, is a measure necessary for the purpose 
of preventing invasion, and, of course, a measure that 
Congress is empowered to adopt •..• 88 . 
Nearly a century passed before the Federal Statute of 1892 requir-
ing all Chinese laborers to obtain certificates of residence was enacted. 
The Supreme Court upheld this statute in Fong Yue Ting v. United States by a 
6 to 3 vote. Justice Gray ruled that the power of
1 
Congress to expel or 
exclude aliens is an aspect of the plenary control over international rela-
tions which is an inherent and inalie~able right of every sovereign and 
independent nation. Gray was even of the opinion that Congress could have 
ordered deportation of aliens lacking certificates of residence by direct 
executive action, without any judicial trial or examination at all. 89 
The Alien Enemy Act of 1798 is still in force,· and it~,.rUSe.was 
_.-----· 
upheld in Ludecke v. Watkins. LuCtecke, a Gennan enemy. alien, who had been 
88serdah 1 , pp. 187-188. 
;, 89Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). ~ l--------------------------------------..... 
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interned in the United States during World War II, was ordered deported to 
Germany in January 1946, when the shooting war was over, but before the 
legal state of the war had been terminated. Justice Frankfurter ruled that 
the President was acting under his war powers and that the order of deporta-
tion was not judicially reviewable. 9o 
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, Justice Jackson ruled that the 
policy toward aliens is vi.tally and intricately interwoven with contempor-
aneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, 
and the maintenance of a republican form of gove,rnment, which are so 
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be 
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. 91 
· Although the Supreme Court has ruled that deportation of aliens is 
· a civil rather than a criminal matters and the power rests with the federal 
government, the basic constitutional authority of Congress to deport or to 
delegate this power to the President has not been questioned. One can 
( assume, therefore, that this is a political question--one in which the Court 
L . wi 11 not become involved. 
t. 
90Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). 






MILITARY TRIAL OF ENEMIES 
Since courts-martial are for those offenders of military law, (see 
section on Military Justice) another type of tribunal was needed for the 
trial of civilians as well as mi1itary personnel who are accused of criminal 
· . acts contrary to the common laws of war as well as martial law~ For this 
~· reason military comm1ss i Olli were established. 92 
l I 
,. ' 
It is within the,President's authority as Conmander in Chief to 
deter.mine the composition of the military commissions. There is no statua-
tory maximum or minimum with regard to the number of members on the 
! colTITlission. Military colTITlissions, however, have usually been composed of 
five members. Less than three members would be contrary to past precedent; 
but any number would be legal. 93 The military cormnission convened by order 
' ! 
of President Johnson for the trial of Lincoln's assassins was composed of 
n.i ne members . 94 
Congress by statute has subjected to military· trials any person 
who in time of war is found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy; and person 
who aids or attempts to aid the enemy with arms, anmunition. supplies, money, 
.--/· 
92 , Manual for Cburts-Martial (Washington:·' Government 
Printing Office, 1910), p. 6. 
9Jwinthrop, An Abridgment ••• , p. 333. 
94Guy w. Moore, The Case of Mrs. Surratt (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1954). p. 30. 
;;. ' 
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.. · or any other thing; any person who, without proper authority, knowingly 
harbors or protects or gives intelligence to or corrmunicates or corresponds 
with or holds any intercourse with the enemy directly or indirectly; and any 
person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military trial. 95 '· 
President Roosevelt established a military corrmission in 1942 to 
try eight German saboteurs who had been landed in the United States by 
submarine for the express~urpose of blowing up factories, military equip-
I 
ment and installations. When the case before the fuilitary tribunal was 
nearly finished, the counsel for the saboteurs, despite an executive order 
denying the saboteurs a 11 access to ci vi 1 courts, obtained a writ of habeas 
corpus contending their right to a trial in a civil court. In a unanimous 
.~-· 
decision of 8 to O, Mr. Chief Justice Stone ruled that it was unnecessary 
to determine the extent of presidential authority ~s Corrmander in Chief 
since tongress had provided for the trial of offenses against the law of war 
by such commissions, and the acts charged against the saboteurs were offenses 
against the law of war. 
It has not hitherto been challenged, and, so far as 
we are advised, it has never been suggested in the 
very extensive literature of the subject that an alien 
spy, in time of war, could not be tried by military 
tribunal without a jury. We conclude that the Fifth ____ _,, 
and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authotltY 
' -
95Lewis Mayers, The American Legal System.(New York:· Harper & Brothers, 
1955), p. 532. . . 
;"' 






was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses 
against the law of war by military commissions, and 
that petitioners, charged with such an offense not 
required to be tried by jury at common law, were 
la~fully9g1aced on trial by the Commission without a Jury. 
Following World War II certain Japanese generals who had commanded 






·military commission in the Philippines. Yamashita, Commanding General of 
I 
the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese/Army in the Philippine 
Islands, was charged with violating the laws of war in pennitting members of 











people of the United States and its allies. 
The Supreme Court again recognized the right to challenge the 
military proceedings by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, the 
I 
Court held that the military .commission had been properly set up in accord-
ance with federal statutes which provided for trial by such commissions of 
enemy combatants charged with violating' the law of war. The Court ruled that 
the authority of the military had not ended with the cessation of hostilities, 
. but only with the formal establishment of peace by either proclamation or 
treaty. The Court further held that the offenses charged against Ge.neral 
Yamashita constituted violations pf the law of war, and declafed.that the 
procedure and rules of evidence employed by the military commission are not 
l----·9_6E_x_·.iillpa•r-te-Q-u1_r_1n_,_ .... 31_7_u._s_._1_,_3_0_(1-9-42
111111
)_. ___________ _. 
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subject to judicial scrutiny but are reviewable only by higher military 
authorities. 97 
Hirota v. MacArthur differed from In re Yamashita in that the 
Japanese defendents involved had been tried for war crimes before a military 
tribunal set up by General MacArthur as the agent for the Allied Powers which 
had defeated Japan. The defendents attempted to file petitions of habeas 
corpus directly with the Supreme Court, but their motions were denied on the 
.. 
grounds that the courts of the United Stat.es could have no jurisdiction over 
this tribunal due to its international character. 
We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these 
petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States. 
The United States and other Allied countries conquered 
and now occupy. and control Japan. General Douglas 
MacArthur has be.en selected and is acting as the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers. The military tribunal 
sentencing these petitioners has been set up by General 
MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers. Under 
the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United 
States have no power or authority to review, to affirm, 
set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed 
on these petitioners and for this reason the motions 
f~r leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
are denied. 98 . 
Johnson v. Eisentrager was convened by twenty-one German nationals 
in the service of the German government who were located in China during 
World War II. They were charged with having, in violation of the law of war, 
~ 
971n re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
98Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948). l---------_____, 
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continued hostilities after the surrender of Gennany by furnishing intelli-
gence regarding American forces to the Japanese. After the surrender of 
Japan, the German nationalists were taken into custody and convicted by an 
American military commission in the Chinese theatre. The def en dents app 1 i ed 
for and obtained from the court of appeals in the District of Columbia, a 
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that 11 any perso.n, including an enemy 
alien, deprived of his liberty anywhere under the purported authority of the 
• 
United States is entitled to the writ if .. ·he can show that extension to his 
case of any constitutional rights or limitations would show his imprisonment 
illegal." When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, it said that it 
had never heard of a writ of habeas corpus being issued by a court on behalf 
of an ~lien enemy who, at ro relevant time and in no stage of his ·captivity, 
. 
has been within its (the United States) territorial jurisdiction. Residence 
within the country is essential to qualify an alien for judicial protection 
by American courts and an enemy alien not within our borders had no right of 
access to our courts. 99 
As can be seen from the above cases, the Supreme Court shows little 
concern of enemy aliens and members of the armed forces of enemy powers with 
regard to their subjection to military trial and punishment. Enemy alien~ 
who penetrate United States lines,in an attempt to commit sabotage, as well 






as those captured enemies accused of war crimes, may be condemned to death by 
. 
a military commission set up by the President as Commander in Chief. Insofar 
as the Court is satisfied that the military comnission is set up under the 
laws of war, it will not inquire into the conformity of their proceedings to 
those of due process of law. The Court also has refused to look into the 
procedures employed by military commissions in the trial of enemy aliens 
outside the United States. In short, the Supreme Court will not interfere 
• 
with the President's authority as Commander in Chief with regard to military 
~. commissions convened for the trial of offenders against the laws of war. 
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MARTIAL LAW AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS 
Alarmed by the supposed danger of Japanese invasion of the Pacific 
coast after Pearl Harbor and under the apprehension that all persons of 
Japanese ancestry were a potential threat to the United States, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066 in response to increas-
ing pressures from the War Department as well as Congress. The Order 
• 
authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe "military areas" from which any 
person deemed dangerous were to be excluded, expelled, or restricted, in 
order to prevent espionage and sabotage. In essence, the Order authorized 
the evacuation of some 112,000 West Coast Japanese, two-thirds of whom were 
American citizens, to relocation centers lOO "in the desert country of 
California, Arizona, Idaho, Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming and in the delta 
areas of Arkansas, where they were put in charge of a presidentially created 
civilian agency called the War Relocation Authority." 101 The essential 
paragraphs o'f the document read as follows: 
Whereas the successful prosecution of the war requires 
every possible protection against espionage and against 
sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense 
premises, and national-defense utilities .... 
' lOOc. Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), p. 362. 
lOlEdward S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers (New York: 
, New York University Press, 1957), p. 256. l------------
~ -----------------------------------------------------------------------. 
- 44 -
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in 
me as President of the United States, and Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and 
direct the Secretary of War, and the military commanders 
whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he 
or any designated commander deems such action necessary 
or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such 
places and of such extent as he or the appropriate 
military commander may determine, from which any or 
all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, 
the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave 
shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary 
of War or the appro~riate military commander may impose 
in his discreti~n. 02 . 
A Congressional Resolution of March 21, 1942, made it a misdemeanor 
11 to knowingly enter, remain in, or leave prescribed military areas'' contrary 
to the orders of the commanding officer of the area. 103 This Executive 
Order, which in perspective seems to have been wholly unnecessary, has been 
. . 
called by Professor Corwin 11 the most drastic invasion. of the rights of 
citizens of the United States by their own government that has thus far 
occurred in the history .of our nation.i• 104 
The first case to reach the Supreme Court challenging the right 
of the government to override the customary civil rights of the Japanese-
Americans was Hirabayashi v. United States. The circumstances of this 
particular case provided an opportunity for the Court to avoid the more 
102Federal Register, Vol. VI,, No. 38, pp. 1407-1528. 
103 . U.S., Statutes at Large, LVI, 173. 
[ 104Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Alfred A. 
l--K-n-o-pf_, __ 19_4_7_), __ p_._9_1_. ___________________________________________ ~ 
' . 
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difficult constitutional question of whether the procedures were contrary 
to due process, or to justify them on the ground that they were a 'military. 
necessity. Shortly before the evacuation program had been undertaken, the 
Army ·adopted a curfew regulation requiring all aliens and persons of 
Japanese ancestry to be in their residences between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 
Hirabayashi, and American-born citizen of alien Japanese parents, was con-
victed of failure both to .pbey the curfew and to report for registration for 
evacuation. The Court upheld the curfew regulations as a valid military 
measure to prevent espionage and sabotage. 
Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty 
to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, · 
we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the 
military authorities and of Congress that there were 
disloyal members of that population, whose number and 
strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertain-
ed. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the 
Government did not have ground for believing that in 
a critical hour such persons could not readily be 
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a 
menace to the national defense and safety .... 105 
While emphas~zing that distinctions based on ancestry were "by their very 
nature "odius to a free people" the Court nonetheless felt "that in time of 
war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a 
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry." 106 
The next case to reach the Court was Korematsu v. United States. 
105Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
106Ibid.' p. 81. 
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. 
Korematsu, and Amerfcan citizen of Japanese ancestry, remained in California 
after it had been ordered cleared of all persons of Japanese descent by 
Executive Order, itself confirmed by an Act of Congress. He refused to 
leave and was convicted under the law. In an o~inion written by Mr. Justice 
Black, the Court held.that this was a valid exercise of the war power. 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because 
of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because 
we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the 
properly constituted military authorities feared an 
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take 
proper security measures, because they decided that the 
military urgency of the situation demanded that all 
citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the 
West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, 
reposing its confidence in this time of war in our 
military leaders--as inevitably it must--detennined 
that they should have the powe~ to do just this. There 
was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the 
military authorities considered that the need for 
action was great, and time Was short. · We cannot--by 
availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hind-
sight--now say that at that time these actions were 
.unjustified. 107 
The third case to reach the Court and resolved on the same day as 
Korematsu v. United States was Ex parte Endo.· Miss Mitsuye Endo, an American 
citizen of Japanese ancestry, with established loyalty to the United States, 
. was a permanent employee in the California Civil Service. Under the order 
of relocation Miss Endo was evacuated from Sacramento to a relocation center 
near Tule Lake, California. The Court held that an American citizen of 
107Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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Japanese ancestry whose loyalty to this country had been established could 
not constitutionally be held in a war relocation center but must be uncon-
! f ditionally released. The government-had allowed persons to leave relocation 
t l centers under Conditions designed to prevent II a di SOrderly mi grati On Of Un-
wanted people to unprepared communities. 11 The Court held that the purpose of 
the evacuation and detention program was to protect the war effort against 
sabotage and espionage. '';. person who is concededly loyal presents no 
problems of espionage or sabotage .... He who is loyal is by definition not a 
spy or a saboteur. 11 It follows, therefore, that the authority to detain a 
citizen of Japanese ancestry ends when his loyalty is established, and to be 
otherwise held would be not on grounds of military necessity, but on grounds 
of race. lOB 
The Court refused to rule on the basi~ constitutional issues of 
relocation, confinement, and segregation programs for the Japanese-Americans 
in the above cases. Undoubtedly the Court was influenced by what it felt 
was a feeling of military necessity on the part of those in charge at the 
time. The racial aspect of the entire program made the whole thing most 
unfortunate. 
108Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 2a3 (1944). 
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY AND ESPIONAGE 
The Constitution empowers Congress to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce. 109 In so doing, Congress may make such regulations as it 
deems fit toward the crippling of the enemy and the winning of the war. Event~ 
! leading up to the War of 1812 prompted Congress to exercise this power, and 
it passed The Embargo Acteof December 22, 1807, which in effect was an Act 
laying embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the 
United States. 
Be it enacted that an embargo be, and hereby is laid 
on all ships and vessels in the ports and places with-
in the limits or jurisdiction of the United States, 
cleared or not cleared, bound to any foreign port or 
place; and that no clearance be furnished to any ship 
or vessel bound to such foreign port or place, except 
vessels under the immediate direction ·of the President 
of the United States .... 110 
Following this, and several other Embargo Acts, Congress passed the 
Non-Intercourse Act on March 1, 1809, interdicting the commercial trade 
... 
between the United States and Great Britain and France as well as their 
dependent territories. 
· ... the entrance of the harbors and waters of the United 
· States ... be interdicted to all public ships and vessels 
belonging to Great Britain or France .... And if any 
' 
r 109u.s., Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3. 
llOu.s., Statutes at Large, II, 451. 
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ship or vessel ... shall enter any harbor or waters with-
in the jurisdiction of the United States ... it shall be 
lawful for the President of the United States, or such 
other person as he shall deem necessary, to compel such 
ship or vessel to depart .... 111 
The use of presidential powers under the Commander-in-Chief clause 
are virtually unlimited du~ng times of crisis. President Lincoln made use 
of these powers in 1861 when he set forth his proclamation declaring a 
blockade on the southern p~rts of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
Mississippi, Louisia~a, and Texas. 112 
The constitutional power of the President to proclaim a blockade 
of enemy ports was upheld without exception. In The Amy Warwick case, the 
district court of Massachusetts ruled that the President had 11 plenary11 
power as Commander in Chief to proclaim and to enf~rce a ·blockade when war 
de facto existed without the necessity of a prior declaration of war by 
Congress. 
There can be no doubt of the right of the President 
to•make maritime capt~res and submit them to judicial 
investigation .... Some have thought that it was to 
be deemed enemy's country, because of the proclama-
tion of the President. It seems rather that the 
proclamation and the blockade are to be upheld as 
legal a~~3valid because the territory is that of an 
. enemy. 
lllu.s., Statutes at Large, II, 528. 
112Richardson, Vol. VI, pp. 14-15. 
.. . 
113The Amy Warwick, 1 Fed. Cas. 799, 804, 805 (D. Mass., 1862), No. 341. 
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When the above case as well as others reached the Supreme Court on 
appeal, the Court held that the President by virtue of his power as Chief 
Executive and Commander in Chief is entitled to treat a region known to be in 
insurrection as enemy country and thereby strip all its inhabitants of their 
constitutional rights. President Lincoln's Declaration of Blockade for 
Confederate ports was valid on the basis that the rebellion was a state of 
war under domestic and in'iernational law. The Court further ruled that this 
was a political question to be decided by the President--not the Courts. 114 
A number of Supreme Court cas.es decided after the war strictly con-
strued the President's power as Commander in Chief to license trading with 
the enemy during the Civil War. 115 
In The Sea Lion decided in 1867, the Court held that under the 
original Act of June 13, 1861, issued by President Lincoln on the blockade, 
the President could grant or authorize a permit to pass through the blockade . 
. The Sea Lion, holding a license issued by a special agent of the Treasury 
Department who was acting under the orders of the commanding general of the 
Union Army in New Orleans, broke the blockade, and was captured for condem-
nation as a prize of war. The Court further held that the license held by 
the Sea Lion was null and void and that the ship and its cargo could validly 
' be seized as a prize of war as the license had not been issued by the 
ll4The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863). 
115schubert, p. 221. 
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'. d 116 Pres1 ent. 
The Court held the same view in Coppell v. Hall. Certificates 
were being issued by the British consul to protect cotton from seizure by the 
Union forces before it could be transported to New Orleans and then exported 
to England. The Court decision in this ~ase reads as follows: 
The military orders set forth in the record were unwar-
ranted and void. The President alone could license trade 
with the rebel territory, and when thus licensed; it 
could be carried only in conformity to regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Treasury (which had been 
approved by the President). The subject was wholly 
beyond the sphere of the powers and duties of the 
military authorities. l 17 
Under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 
6, 1917, the President was given powers over importation and exportation to 
enemy countries except under such regulations as he might choose to make. 
Be it enacted ... that it shall be unlawful for any 
person in the United States, except with the license 
of the President, granted to such person, or to the 
enemy, or ally of the enemy, as provided in this 
Act, to trade, or attempt to trade either directly 
or- indirectly, with, to, or from, or for, or on 
account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, 
any other person, with knowledge or reasonable 
cause to believe that such other person is an enemy 
or ally of enemy, or is conducting or taking part 
·in such trade, directly or indirectly for, or on 
· account of, or on behalf of11 gr for the benefit of, 
. an enemy or ally of enemy. 
116rhe Sea Lion, 5 Wallace 630, 647 (1867). 
117coppellv. Hall, 7 Wallace 542, 556 (1869). 




Referring to President Wilson's authoritative use of the power 
given to him under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 Berdahl elaborates 
by stating: 
By virtue of this authority, President Wilson at various 
times during the war proclaimed an embargo on long lists 
of articles, and prohibited the importation of other 
articles, except under a system of licenses which he 
placed under the supervision of the War Trade Board. In 
this way he was able to exercise complete control over 
the foreign tra!e of the United States during the period 
of the war, and thus to prevent supplies from reaching 
the enemy, either directly or through neutral channels. 11 9 
Following closely upon the heels -Of.the Trading with the Enemy Act 
was the Espionage Act of May 16, 1918. This Act was far more drastic than 
the Act of June 15, 1917, and made the Sedition Act of 1798 1 ook very mild. 
Under Attorney-General Palmer the Espionage Act was drastically enforced, 
and freedom of spee.ch and of the press temporarily disappeared. 
Be it enacted that ... whoever, when the United States 
is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write, or 
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive 
language about the form of government of the United 
States, or the Constitution of the United States, ... 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 
or imprisynment for not more than twenty years, or 
both.... 20 
The most famous case under these laws was Schenck v. United States. 
Schenck was the general secretary,of the Socialist Party. He sent out about 
ll9Berdahl, p. 210. 





15,000 leaflets to men who had been called to military service, urging them 
to assert their opposition to the Conscription Act. He was indicted on 
three counts under the Espionage Act of 1917: (1) Conspiracy to cause 
insubordination in the military service of the United States, (2) Using the 
mails to send matter declared to be nonmailable by the Espionage Act, and 
(3) The unlawful use of the mails for the transmission of the same matter 
as mentioned above. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Holmes 
was faced with the problem of squaring the Espionage Act with the lst 
Amendment which states, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press .... 11 Holmes ruled that Congress had the con-
stitutional power to prevent speech and publication that constituted a "clear 
and present danger." Schenck's activities, Holmes ruled,. did in fact con-
stitute such ~ danger. 121 
A week later the Court decided the case of Socialist leader, Eugene 
V. Debs. Debs made a speech before the Ohio state convention of the Socialist 
Party at Canton, and was subsequently arrested. The Court held that the 
.. 
delivery of a speech with such words and in such circumstances that the 
probable effect would be to prevent recruiting--and with that intent--is 
punishable under the Espionage Act of 1917 as amended in 1918. 122 
Nine months later the Court decided Abrams v. United States. In 
12lschenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
122Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
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this case, Abrams and four other Russians were indicted for conspiring to 
violate the Espionage Act. They published two leaflets that denounced the 
efforts of capitalist nations to interfere with the Russian Revolution, 
criti.cized the President and the plutocratic gang in Washington for sending 
American troops to Russia, and urged workers producing muni~ions in the 
United States not to betray their Russian comrades. Without mentioning the 
clear and present danger ijoctrine the Court found that the defendants had 
intended to 11 urge, ·incite, and advocate 11 curtailment of production necessary 
to the war. The Court reasoned that the 11men must be held to have.intended, 
and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to 
produce. 11 - 123 
Only one case of espionage, that of Hartzel v. United States was 
decided by the Supreme Court during World War IL Hartzel was prosecuted for 
publishing and mailing 11 scurrilous and vitriolic attacks on the English, the 
Jews and the President of the United States 11 to a carefully selected mailing 
list. The Court held that two major elements are necessary to constitute an 
offense under the Espionage Act. 
The first element is a subjective one, consisting of 
a specific intent ... to cause insubordination or dis-
.loyalty in the anned forces .... The second element 
is an objective one, consisting of a clear and present 
danger that the activit1es in question will bring 
about the substantive evils which Congress has a right 





to prevent .... Both el~ments must be proved by the 
Government beyond a reasonable doubt. ·124 
The Court failed to find the requisite intent and ruled that a crime had not 
been committed under the statute. 
Nearly all the cases tried under these Acts by the Supreme Court 
have been upheld, and the laws judged to be constitutional, thus enabling 
the President as Commander in Chief to exercise a complete control over all 
• 
business having any relation to war needs, which in modern times includes 
practically the entire business life of the nation, as well as complete 
control over freedom of speech and the press during times of crisis. 
124Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 {1944). 
. ' 
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SEIZURE ANO REGULATION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
The power of the President as Commander in Chief to confiscate 
citiz.en's property during time of crisis has increased immensely since World 
War I, due to the demands that war and its aftermath have made on the nation's 
economy. 
During World Wa& I, President Wilson, acting with statuatory 
authority conferred on him by Congress under the National Defense Act of 
August 29, 1916, issued a proclamation permitting the seizure of various 
transportation utilities including all railroads in the United States and 
the terminals in seaports for ocean-going vessels as well as telephone, tele-
graph, and the commercial cable line . 
... I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the· United 
States, under and by virtue of the powers vested 
in me ... take possession and assume control at 
12 o'clock noon on the 28th day of December, 
1917, of each and every system of transportation 
... consisting of railroads, and owned or controlled 
systems of coastwise and inland transportation ... 
al so terminals, terminal companies, ... sleeping 
and parlor cars, private cars and private car 
lines, elevators, warehouses, telephone and 
telegraph lines ... to the end that such systems 
of transportation be utilized for the transfer 
·and transportation of troops, war material and 
equipment .... It is hereby directed that the 
possession, control, operation and utilization 
of such transportation systems hereby by me 
undertaken sha 11 be exercised by and through 
... 
- 57 -
William G. McAdoo, who is hereby appointed an9 25 '· designated Director-General of Railroads .... 
Professor Schubert states that there were numerous cases decided in 
the state and lower federal courts dealing with the validity of the Director 
General 1s orders. The majority of cases decided in the state courts denied 
his authority whereas the majority of those cases decided in the federal 
courts upheld as constitutional and valid the authority of the Director 
General 1 s orders. 126 • 
In both Rhodes v. Tatum and Dahn v. McAdoo, the Court held that 
"Any order issued by Mr. McAdoo as Director General must be considered as 
the order of the President." l27 
The Court made the same ruling .in Mardis v. Hine~ in 1920. It said 
that "the orders of the Director General were in the sense of the Act of 
1918, the orders of the President. 11 128 
The most controversial aspects of federal control by the President 
came under the heading of interim rate-making powers in setting rate 
~ 
schedules for intrastate as well as interstate commerce. In reality, the 
125Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson, War and Peace, Vol. I (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), pp .. 
143-144. 
126schtibert, p. 242 .. 
127Rhodes v. Tatum, 206 S.W. 114, 118 (Texas, 1918), 
256 F. 549 (N.D~ Iowa, E.D. at Dubuque, 1919). 
128Mardis v. Hines, 267 F. 171, 173 (8 C.C.A., 1920). 
and Dahn v. McAdoo, 
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Director General in his order of May 25, 1918, had set the rates. The North 
Dakota State Utilities Commission on appeal to the state Supreme Court was 
granted a writ of mandamus ordering McAdoo to authorize only the lower rates 
that.were previously approved by the Utilities Commission for intrastate 
hauling in North Dakota rather than the rates as set by McAdoo in his general 
order. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, however, and 
in so doing upheld the power of the President and his delegation of power to 
Director General McAdoo, to determine all rate schedules for railroads for 
the duration of the war emergency. 129 
Similan.legislation was passed by a joint resolution of Congress on 
July 16, 1918, and President Wilson in his proclamation of July 22, 1918, 
used -the authority empowered to him by Congress, assumed possession and con-
trol over the operation of all telephone and telegraph systems throughout 
the United States. Wilson ditected the Postmaster General to assume control 
and set a rate schedule. 130 The facts and results in Dakota Central 
Telephone Company v. South Dakota ex rel Payne are basically identical to 
those in the Northern Pacific Railroad Company case cited above. The 
South Dakota Supreme Court issued an order directing the utility companies 
· not to put into effect the higher schedule of rates for intrastate teleph?ne 
129Northern Pacific Railroad Com an v. North Dakota ex rel William 
Langer, 250 U.S. 135 1919 . 
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service as established by the Postmaster General. The United States Supreme 
Court reversed the decision, as in the Railroad Case, on the basis that the 
joint resolution was constitutional, the acts of the Postmaster General under 
that ·delegation. were the same in legal effect as though performed by the 
President himself, and the judiciary had no power to review the wisdom or 
necessity of the determination of the particular rate schedule here 
involved. 131 
• 
During World War II most seizures of industrial and commercial 
properties were made by the President under Section 3 of the War Labor 
Disputes Act of 1943. The Act authorized the President to seize any 11 plant, 
mine or facility equipped for war production which was threatened by a strike 
that might unduly impede or delay the war effort. 11 The Act further enjoined 
the President with the authority to di'rect the management of the enterprises 
until such time as the labor dispute was settled. 132 
Be it enacted that ... the power of the President under 
the foregoing provisions of this section to take 
irrtnediate possession of any plant upon a failure to 
comply with any such provisions, and the authority 
granted by this section for the use and operation by 
the United States or in its interests of any plant 
of which possession is so taken, shall also apply as 
hereinafter provided to any plant equipped for the 
·manufacture, production, or mining of any articles or 
materials which may be required for the national defense 
or which may be useful 1n connection therewith. Such 
131 Dakota Central Tele hone South Dakota ex rel Pa ne, I· 250 U.S. 163, 184 1919 . l·--____ 1_3_2_u_.s_._,_s_t_a_t_ut_e_s_a_t __ 1_ar_g_e_,_L_I_I_I_,_1_6_3_. __________________________ ....,. 
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service as established by the Postmaster General. The United States Supreme 
Court reversed the decision, as in the Railroad Case, on the basis that the 
joint resolution was constitutional, the acts of the Postmaster General under 
that delegation were the same in legal effect as though performed by the 
President himself, and the judiciary hadno power to review the wisdom or 
necessity of the determination of the particular rate schedule here 
involved. 131 
• 
During World War II most seizures of industrial and commercial 
properties were made by the President under Section 3 of the War Labor 
Disputes Act of 1943. The Act authorized the President to seize any "plant, 
mine or facility equipped for war production which was threatened by a strike 
that might unduly impede or ~elay the war effort." The Act further enjoined 
the President with the authority to direct the management of the enterprises 
until such time as the labor dispute was settled. 132 
Be it enacted that ... the power of the President under 
.the foregoing provisions of this section to take 
imtnediate possession of any plant upon a failure to 
comply with any such provisions, and the authority 
granted by this section for the use and operation by 
the United States or in its interests of any plant 
of which possession is so taken, shall also apply as 
hereinafter provided to any plant equipped for the 
·manufacture, production, or mining of any articles or 
materials which may be required for the national defense 
or which may be useful ,n connection therewith. Such 
Dakota ex rel Pa ne, 
132 . I l 
. U.S., Statutes at Large, L II, 63. 
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. power and authority may be exerci seci oy the President 
through such department or agency of the Government 
as he may designate, and may be exercised with respect 
to any such plant, whenever the President finds, after 
investigation, and proclaims that there is an interrup-
tion of the operation of such plant as a result of a 
strike or other labor disturbance, that the national 
defense program will be unduly impeded or·delayed by 
such interruption, and that the exercise of such power 
and authority is necessary to insure the opera ti on of 133 such plant in the interest of the national defense •.. 
Those cases that-reached the Supreme Court did so after the 
I 
.hostiTlt'kls ceased. The first case to reach the Court was Ken-Rad Tube and 
Lamp Corporation v. Badeau. Badeau, a colonel in the Army, assumed possesi"!'on 
and management of the Ken_-Rad Company in comp 11 ance with the President's order 
of Apr1l 13, 1"944. Ken-Rad contended that the President's order directing 
··--" the setzure of the plants was based on the fear of threatened strikes 
resulting from t~e fact of their refusal to comply 1with an allegedly invalid 
order of the War Labor B~ard, and therefore, the President's order was also 
invalid. The federal district court h.eld that: 
133 
The record fails to disclose any grounds upon which the 
Court could find that the President, in issuing the 
order" acted arbitrarily or without cause. He was not 
bound by the findings of the War Labor Board. Even 
thougn they might have been·based upon erroneous pro-
cedure or wrongful construction of facts, the Pres i- _.~ --
dent may have had other facts upon which he determined--_/ 
his course ..• it is our Judgment that section 9 doeS'~-----
not ·confine the President to any one field of infonnation 
but that he may make his own independent investigation 
and, subject to the determi'nation .by the Courts that 
Ibid., p. 163. 
I 
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his action was not arbitrary, may act to prevent a 
cessation of operations of any plant or business or 
other agency which might be utilized to contribute 
to the war effort. We further conclude that without 
an Act of Congress there was sufficient authority by 
the terms of the Constitution itself to justify the 
action of the President in this case •.. when war has 
been declared and is actually existing, his functions 
as Conmander in Chief become of the highest importance 
and his operations in that connection are entirely 
beyond the control of the legislature. There devolves 
upon, by virtue of his office, a solemn responsibility 
to preserve the-nation and it is our judgment that there 
is specifically granted. to him authorityrto utilize 
all resources of the country to that end. 134 
In 1944 under Executive Order 9508 issued by President Roosevelt, 
the Secretary of War took possession of and directed the operation of 
Montgomery Ward's plant and facilities in Chicago. ·The Chicago Federal 
District Court ruled that Montgomery Ward was engaged in retail selling and 
distribution, not production and since the War Lab9r Disputes Act pertained 
only to war production, the seizure of Ward's ras an unconstitutional use of 
I 
the President's powers as Conmander in. Chief. The government succeeded in 
getting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals -to rule that Ward's was "a 
. 
plant engaged in war production" under the Failr Labor Standards Act of 1938 
which stated that 'Produced' means producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, 
or transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, 3r...-ilf-any 
..... -' 
process or occupation necessary tb the production thereof, in any State. The 
134Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corporation v. Badeau, 55 F. Supp. 193i 197-198 
(W.D. Ky., OWensboro D., 1944). 
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district court with directions to dismiss as moot due to the fact that the 
President had returned Ward's properties before the Supreme Court had reached 
the case on its docket. 136 
In United States v. United Mine Wor~ers of America the Court ruled 
on the'i>resident's constitutional powers to convert'private property to 
public uses in time of war. The Court held that "in October, 1946, tne United 
States was in possession of,· and operating, the major portion of the country's 
bituminous coal mines. (1) The United States had taken possession of the 
mines pursuant to Executive Order 9728 of May 21, 1946, 11 FR 5593, in whtch 
I 
the President, after dete·rmining that labor disturbances were interrupting 
the pn:1duction of bituminous coal necessary for the operation of the 
national economy during the transition from·war to peace, directed the 
Secretary .of the Interior to take possession of and operate the mines and to 
negoti~e with representatives of the mines concerning the terms and con-
. ditions of employment. The President's action was taken under the-Constitu-
. ....--
tion, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the A".'my 
135Montg0mery Ward & Company v. United States, 326 U.S. 690 (1945). 
- 63 -
· and Navy .• and by virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the War 
Labor Disputes Act. 136 
The development and use of presidential power as Commander in Chief 
to assume temporary control and possession of private enterprise was halted 
' .. ,/ 
by the Supreme Court's decision in the Youngstown steel case of 1952. In 
the latter part of 1951 a dispute arose between the steel companies and their 
employees over terms and.1tonditions that should be included in new collective 
bargaining agreements. Long continued conferences failed to settle the 
dispute. On December 18, 1951, the employees' representative of the United 
States Workers of America gave notice of an intention to strike when the 
agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
.,,,.~--·· 
Service intervened. but unsuccessfully, and President Trl.111an then referred 
the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make 
recommendations for fair, and equitable tenns of settlement. This failed, and 
the Union gave notice of a nationwide strike called to begin at 12:01 a.m., 
I 
April 9. The. indispensability of steel led.President Truman to believe that 
the proposed strike would immediately jeopardize our national defense, and 
he issued an Executive Order directing Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to take 
..----··. ·-
poss es s ion af the steel mills and keep them running. In a 6 to .. 3--vote the 
..... .-·" 
,. 
Court ruled that the power of the President to issue such an order must stem 
l36united States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 262 
(1947). 
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from an Act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. Only two statutes 
authorize seizure under cer;tain conditions, but the government admitted these 
conditions were not met, since ·the production involved was too cumbersome and 
time-co~suming. Moreover, in the consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act, 
Congress rejected an amendment authorizing governmental seizures in an 
emergency.· Nor is there any provision in the Constitution that would warrant 
this seizure. As Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President still 
I 
has no right to seize private prqperty to keep labor disputes from stopping 
production. This was a matter for Congress only, not for military author-
ities. Neither does the Constitution pennit the President to legislate--a 
·function which belongs only to Congress, in good times or in bad times. This 
seiiure order cannot stand. 137 
he says: 
Professor Schubert best sums up the Presjdent's seizure powers when 
The question remains whether the President does not 
still have a choice among alternative procedures. 
Certainly the Supreme Court would uphold his selec-
tion if he acted under circumstances which the Court 
would accept as time of war, and the Youngstown case 
is the only instance in our entire history when the 
Supreme Court failed to follow the leydership of the 
Commander in Chief in such a matter. 38 . 
137voungstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Charles Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952). 
138schubert,_ p. 251. 
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Schubert goes on to say that "the future will find the Youngstown decision 
being confined to its very special facts, something to be reprinted in case-
. 
books for the enlightenment of students of constitutional law but not a 
precedent which the Court is obliged to take seriously in a moment of national 
'./ . 
crisis ... l39 
l39tbid., p. 251. • • I 
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HABEAS CORPUS AND MARTIAL LAW 
The provision in the Constitution pennitting the suspension of the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "when in cases of rebellion or invasion 
the public safety may -require it" 140 indicates tha~ the taking of extra-
ordinary measures in cases of such emergency was· clearly recognized as 
necessary and proper by t~e framers of the Constitu~ion. It must be noted, 
however, that there was some objec1'.ion to this cla~se at the time. In a 
' I letter to Madison, Jefferson protested as follows: 
Why suspend Hab. Corp. in insurrections & rebellions? 
... If publick safety requires that the government 
should have a man imprisoned on less probable testi-
mony in those than in other emergencies; let him be 
taken & tried, retaken & retried, while the necessity 
continues, only giving him redress against the 
government for damages. Examine the history of 
England. See how few of the cases of the suspension 
of the Habeas Corpus law have been worthy of that 
suspension. They have been either real treasons 
wherein the parties might as well have been charged 
at once, or sham plots where it was shameful they 
should ever have been suspected. ·vet for the few 
cases wherein the suspension of the hab. corp. has 
done real good, that operation is now becoming 
habitual, & the minds of the nation almylf prepared 
to live under its constant suspension. 
140u.s., Constitution, Art. 'l, Sec. 9, Cl. 2. 
. · 141Jul1an P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers of Thomas Jeffersgn, Vol. 13 
(New Jersey,: Princeton University Press, .1956), p. · 442. 
r ,, 
;.. 67 -
The Constitution is notably silent as to who determines when and 
where an emergency has arisen and who determines the suspension of the writ--
Congress, The President, or the courts. The general consensus has been, by 
it placement in the Constitution inmediately following the delegated 
powers of Congress, that this power belongs to Congress. 142 However, with 
the outbreak of the Civil War, this general consensus was disregarded by 
President Lincoln when he 8assumed the responsibility of authorizing General 
I 
Scott. the conmanding general of the Army, to suspend the writ • 
. 
You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against 
the laws of the United States. If at any point on 
or in the vicinity of any military line which is now 
or which shall be used between the city of Phila-
delphia and the city of Washington you find resist-
ance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ 
of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally, 
or through the officer in conmand at the point where 
re~isty~§e occurs, are a~thorized to suspend that 
wr1t. 
I 
On July 2, 1861, this au~horization was extended to «over the line between 
New York and Washington. 144 
The first case to come before the Supreme Court challenging the 
. suspension of the writ ~as Ex parte Merryman. John Merryman, a Maryland 
142Kallenbach, p. 545. 
143Richardson, Vol. VI, p. 18. 
1441bid •• p. 19. 
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secessionist sympathizer residing in Maryland, was apprehended by the mili-
tary and placed in custody at Fort McHenry for attempting to hinder the 
success of the Northern cause. Merryman inmediately appealed to Chief 
Justice Taney for a writ of habeas corpus. Taney issued the writ, directed 
to General Cadwalader who was in conmand of the fort. The general refused 
to honor the writ on the grounds that he was authorized by the President to 
suspend the writ of habels corpus, but that he would seek further instruc-
1 
tions. Taney then issued a writ of contempt against General Cadwalader and 
sent a United States marshal to serve it. The marshal reported to Taney that 
he had not been allowed to enter the outer gate of the fort, although he had 
sent in his card, and tha·t he had not been able to serve the writ. Taney 
then delivered an opinion holding the President's power to suspend the writ 
null and void on the grounds that only Congress can suspend the writ since 
the provision appears in,the Article of the Constitution dealing with Con-
gress, and in a list of limitations on Congress, and further that a military 
\ 
officer cannot arrest a person not subject to the rules and articles of 
war, _except in the aid of ci vi 1 authority when the i ndi vi dua 1 has committed 
. _. 
an offense against the United States. In such a case the military officer 
__.-
must deliver the prisoner inmediately to civil authority to be.Aeaft with 
.--
<t· 
according to the law. President Lincoln ignored the ruling, but Mer.ryman was 
- later released from military confinement and turned over to civil author-
ities. 145 
145Ex ---. arte Herr an, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9, 487 (1861). 
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Lincoln responded to the Merryman case of July 4, 1S61,· in his 
message to Congress. Posing the query, "Are all the laws but one to go un-
executed, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated"?, 
he went on to say: 
Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive, 
is vested with this power (to suspend the writ); but _ 
the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is 
to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly 
made for·a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed 
the framers of the instrument intended that in every 
case the danger should run its course until Congress 
could be called together, the very assembling of which 
might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by 
the rebellion.... Whether there shall be any legis-
lation on the subject, and, if any, what, is ~~gmitted 
entirely to the better judgment of Congress. 
~rch 3, 1863, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act which not 
only authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but it 
also legalized his past acts. 147 After Congress passed the Habeas Corpus 
Act, President Lincoln iSsued another proclamation regarding the suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus, citing the ·Act a~ the basis of his authority to do 
so •• 
. .• Whereas by statute which was approved ... the Senate 
and House of Representatives of the United States in 
Congress assembled that during the present insurrect.~ion. ,.-· 
the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require, is authorize 
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus . 
146Richardson, Vol. VI, p. 25. 
147u.S., Statutes at Large, XII. 755. 
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. I in any case throughout the United St,ates or any part 
thereof; ... Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, · 
President of the United States, do hereby proclaim 
and make known to all whom it may concern that the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended 
throughout the United States in the several cases be-
fore mentioned, and that this suspension will continue 
throughout the duration of the said rebellion or 
until this proclamation shall, by a subsequent one to 
be issued by the Presl~snt of the United States, be · 
modified or revoked. 
Several state csurt and lower federal court rulings were made on the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, however, none of the adverse rulings 
reached the United States Supreme Court. ·In most instance~ these state 
· court and lower federal court rulings upheld the validity of the President's 
proclamation of September 15, 1863, as well as the congressional statute of 
March 3, 1863, on the grounds that both the statute and the proclamation were 
. elements in a constitutional congressional plan of ,contingency legislation. 
They further held that t~ere had been no delegation of legislative power~ 149 
Subsequent Supreme Court rulings on the suspension of the writ of 
\ 
habeas corpus were taken up in those cases dealing with martial law and 
subjection of civilians to military trials. l SO 
148Richardson, Vol. VI, pp. 170-171. 
149In re Fagan, 8 Fed. Cas. '947 (D. Mass., 1863), No. 4604; In re Dunn, 
8 Fed. Cas. 93 (S.D.N~Y., 1863), No. 417l; In re Oliver, 17 Wis. 681 (1864). 
l 50Ka 11 enbach, p. 547. 
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The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus merely means that it 
is possible to make military arrests and detention of individuals without 
~r· 
interference by civil courts. Much more serious consideration is given to 
the question of the possibility of interfering in the constitutional rights 
of citizens under the proclamation of martial law. l51 
According to the Manual for Courts-Martial, martial law is 
"military power exercised tin time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, in 
I 
parts of the country retaining their allegiance, ahd over persons and things 
not ordinarily subjected to it." 152 "Martial law," according to the. 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,"is simply military 
authority" exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war •••• " 153 
The most noteworthy controversies were first provided during the 
Civil War when President Lincoln issued his proclamation of September 24, 
! 
1862. Aside from suspending the writ of habeas corpus for those individuals 
.in the North who were interfering with the war effort, he also made them 
subject to martial law. 
Now, therefore,. be it ordered, first, that during the 
existing insurrection, and as a necessary measure for 
suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their 
aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all 
151 Ibid., p. 547. 
152Manual for Courts-Martial, p. 5. 
15Jwar of the Rebe 11 ion •••. , p. 146. 
-· 
- 72 ..: 
persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting 
militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice 
affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority 
of the United States, shall be subject to martial law and 
liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or 
military conmi s s ions •..• " 1 54 
The first and only case to reach the Supreme Court in which the 
trial of civilians by mi 1 i tary courts-martial ·or commissions was challenged 
was that of Ex parte Vallt11digham. Vallandigham was a~ agitator and peace 
democrat from Ohio who had been outspoken in his opposition to the Civil War 
' 
and the war efforts. He was tried by a military commission, convicted and 
sentenced to be imprisoned for the duration of the war. He appealed to 
the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was 
without jurisdiction. Vallandigham's recourse to the federal courts via 
habeas corpus had been cut off by the suspension of the writ. The Court 
further ruled that the· authority of a military conmission is not subject to 
appeal to, or reversal by, any civil court. Since the Supreme Court had no 
·original jurisdiction to issue writs of' habeas corpus, it had no jurisdiction 
to hear Vallandigham's case, and the case was dismissed. 155 
A year after the'civil War was over, the Court ruled on Ex parte 
Milligan. Milligan, a civilian, was arrested by order of General_ Hovey who 
COlllTlanded the military district cff Indiana. Milligan was tried by a military 
154Richardson, Vol. VI, p. 98. 
155Ex ,parte Vallandigham, 1 Wallace 243 q86~). , 
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comm.i ss ion, found gui 1 ty of i ni ti ati ng insurrection and of various treason-
able and disloyal practices, and sentenced to be hanged on May 19, 1865. 
Milligan appealed to the Circuit Court in Indiana for a writ of habeas corpus 
on the grounds that the military proceedings were unconstitutional and 
further claimed his rights to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. The Circuit Court asked the Supreme Court for its opinion. The 
Supreme Court stated that 'f!very trial involves the exercise of judicial 
( 
power and part of the judicial power of the country was conferred upon the 
military conmission because the Constitution expressly vests it "in one 
supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish." The military cannot justify action on the man-
date of the President because he is controlled by law, and has his appro-
priate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not ma~e, the laws. The Court 
stated that in times of ~rave emergencies the Constitution allows the govern-
. 
ment to make arrests without a writ of habeas corpus but it goes no further. 
In other words a citizen may be tried by means other than conmon law. 
·The Court further stated that martial law can be applied only when 
there is real necessity, such as'during an invasion that would effectually 
,.._...-' 
close the courts and civil administration. However, as long a~the-civil 
/~ 
'" ' courts are operating, as they were in this case, the military tribunal ~id 
not have any legal power and authority to try and punish this man--the 
- 74 -
accused is entitled to a civil trial by jury. 156 
There is a considerable parallel between Lincoln's military 
commissions and the situation which prevailed in Hawaii during the greater 
part of World War II. Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
Governor Poindexter of the Territory of Hawaii proclaimed martial law, 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, closed the local courts, and turned 
over the powers of governnl!nt to the commanding general of the United States 
I . 
Anny in Hawaii. The President approved the governor's actions, and the 
military ruled Hawaii until October 24, 1944. 157 
In February 1944, Duncan, a civilian
1 
shipfitter employed by the 
Navy, was convicted of assault for engaging in/ a brawl -with two Marine 
sentries. Duncan was .tried and convicted.by a military tribunal rather than 
a civil court. The Supreme Court in a 6 to 2 \decision ruled that civilians 
in Hawaii are entitled t~ their constitutional\ privilege of a fair trial. 
When Congress passed the Hawaiian Organic Act in 1900, it never intended to 
\ 
overstep the boundaries of military and civilia.n power. The phrase "martial 
law" as employed in that Act, therefore, while intended to authorize the 
military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government 
and for the defense of the Islands against actual or threateneg,..reoellion or 
.--··"" 
" invasion, was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military 
l 56Ex pa rte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 ( 1866). 
157Pritchett, p. 353. 
- 75 -
tribunals. The defendant, then was entitled to be tried by a civil 
court. 158 
Whether the Court's decision in Duncan v. Kahanamoku will set a 
precedent in future emergencies, thereby hampering the executive power, 
' .. 
remains to be seen. A large-scale simulated civil defense test was held in 
1955 whereby A-bomb and H.-bomb attacks took a to 11 of some 14 mi 11 ion ci vi 1-
i an "casualties." Presielent Eisenhower had purposely not been briefed in 
advance on actions which might be taken in or'r tb simulate the exercise as 
close to reality as possible. Eisenhower's action was to immediately suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus and to declare a nationwide state of martial law, 
I 
acting on the' premise that "the ordinary proce'sses of democratic and con-
sti tuti ona l government do not suffice to protect the state in time of 
emergency and must surrender to a modified authori~arian regime." 159 
It could very ~ell be said, then, that the President as Commander 
in Chief will continue to have the po~er and authority to suspend the writ 
of habeas corpus and to declare martial law· in future crises in that "this 
premise is deeply embedded in the teachings of democratic political theory, 
which in its traditional and contemporary expression have counselled the· 
need to abandon the processes of democratic government as the fi.J~s-t--essenti a 1 
'.~,..,---
158ouncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
159J. Malcolm Smith and Cornelius P. Cotter, Powers of the President· 
During Crises (Washington, O.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960), p. 4. 
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·response to emergency conditions." 160 .. 








Having looked at judicial reaction under the broad topics of The 
Executive and the Military,•The Executive and the Enemy, and The Executive 
and the Domestic Scene, we find that the war powers of 'the President have 
been shaped by the Chief Executive through various crises rather than being 
defined and checked by the judiciary. With a few exceptions the Supreme 
Court has sustained the President's actions as Commander in Chief either 
immediately or well after the fact. It must be noted, however, that in a 
majority of the cases reviewed, the Court declared in its decision that the 
subject matter covered was a political question--one to be decided by the 
involved organs of power rather than by the Courts. 
Given the Court's past action in matters dealing with the Presi-
dent's power and authority under the Commander-in-Chief clause, one might 
then ask how strong should the President's power be? Louis W. Koenig in 
the New York Times Magazine wrote that the President should have more power, 
not less. He said that 11 ... the tas'k of future American leadership is 
clear. People must be aroused. Congress moved, the bureaucracy stilred and 
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alliances redirected. Only the President can do it." 161 
President Kennedy said 11 a restricted concept of the Presidency 
is not enough" The decades of the sixties will demand 11 that the President 
place himself in the very thick of the fight," and 11 that he be willing to 
serve them (the people) at the risk of incurring their momentary dis-
162 pleasure. 11 ' 
Robert Hirschfie~d in his article, 11 The Power of the Contemporary 
Presidency, 11 believed that "crisis has become the normal condition of our 
times, 11 and the power th_at came to an earlier President because of war 11 today 
has become a permanent part of the executive office. 11 163 
Richard Neustadt credits the President's own desire for power as 
the strongest deciding factor in determining just how large his powers will 
be. Neus tadt fee 1 s "the outcome will often turn on whether he perceived his 
risk in power terms 11 and if the President "takes account of what he sees 
before he makes his choice." 164 
Since crisis is a permanent facet of the modern executive office, 
161 Louis W. Koenig, "More Power to the President (Not Less), 11 New York 
Times Magazine (January 3, 1965). 
162u.s., Congressional Recor~, 86th Cong., 2nd Se~s., A 353-354. 
163Robert S. Hirschfield, "The Power of the Contemporary Presidency," 
Parliamentary Affairs (Summer, 1961), p. 356. 
164Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadershi 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960 , p. 179. 
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and since the Supreme Court has followed a consistent pattern of non-
interference, the office of the President stands today as the focal point 
of American power to be exercised effectively to defend the country and to 
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States. 
In conclusion, then, we find that Rossiter was most accurate in 
stating that "the contours of the presidential war powers have therefore 
been presidentially, not j•dicially shaped; their exercise is for Congress 
and the people, not the Court, to oversee." l65 The Presidents of the future 
will undoubtedly mold their own powers as Commander in Chief in the light 
of their own interpretation of the Constitution, the actions of their pre-
decessors, congressional statutes, and judicial decisions. Thus equipped 
they should prove able in their capacity as Commander in Chief to meet the 
ever new and challenging crises which they will inevitably have to face in 
domestic emergencies as well as in limited or unlimited wars. 
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